We consider an economic geography model with two inter-regional proximity structures, one due to trade linkages and the other due to social interactions. We investigate how the network structure of social interactions, or the social proximity structure, affects the timing of endogenous agglomeration and the spatial distribution of workers across regions. Endogenous agglomeration emerges when inter-regional trade and/or social interactions incur high transportation costs, and the uniform dispersion occurs when these costs become negligibly small (i.e., when distance dies). In many-region geography, the network structure of social proximity emerges as the determinant of the geographical distribution of workers when trade becomes freer. If social proximity is governed by geographical distance (as in ground transportation), a mono-centric concentration emerges. If geographically distant pairs of regions are "socially close" (due to, e.g., passenger transportation modes with strong distance economy such as regional airlines), then geographically multi-centric spatial distribution can be sustainable.
Introduction
configuration become increasingly symmetric, leading to the symmetric dispersion at threshold values of transportation costs. This behavior is akin to the dispersion process in economic geography models with urban costs (e.g., Helpman, 1998; Tabuchi, 1998) in that dispersion occur when trade is freer, although our model do not have urban costs. The role of the additional dimension -social interactions -is also intuitive. When social interactions are less costly, dispersion is selected because there is fewer incentive to form agglomeration (i.e., the "death of distance").
We then explore a symmetric four-region economy and consider various structure for social proximity. It is the minimal setting to investigate the roles of the network structure of G, since non-trivial (but symmetric) network structures can emerge only when the number of regions is greater than three. Similar to the two-region setup, one of the regions attracts almost all workers when trade and social interaction costs are very high. The economy exhibits a gradual dispersion when these costs go down. The agglomeration force tends to support geographically monocentric pattern of workers along the dispersion process. If the social proximity structure is more integrated as a whole, then agglomeration is less likely compared with less integrated networks. This is because endogenous advantage due to social proximity plays less prominent role when the economy is socially more integrated. Also, if some pair of regions are "socially closer," then various geographical configurations other than the mono-centric pattern can be sustainable. For instance, geographically duo-centric concentration of workers emerges if geographically distant pairs of regions are socially close because of, e.g., passenger transportation modes with strong distance economy (such as regional airlines). In sum, the network structure of social interactions can govern when the dispersion is attained and how it looks like in the process of unbundling of a mono-centric economic agglomeration.
Out for simplicity and clarity, we build on a compromise that social proximity matrix G is exogenously given. There are various possible micro-foundations for G. For instance, it may represent the roles played by passenger travels that supports face-to-face contacts. It may be some aggregate measure, embedded in regional space, of the inter-individual social network that support information exchange and diffusion between regions. It can also be a reduced-form for the decision of big players such as large companies which open up branches in provincial cities, or airline companies connecting major regional cities. All of the interpretations above are meant to be described by sophisticated models, so that the structure of G may be endogenously determined by micro-economic mechanisms. We instead give G exogenously, for our aim in this paper is to provide the first-order insights into the workings of an additional inter-regional linkage other than goods trade. This strategy is akin to that in the network game literature (Jackson, 2010) that focuses on the roles of the structure of the inter-individual social network, or to that in the economic geography literature in general where it is a standard approach to suppose an exogenous inter-regional proximity structure.
In the following, Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 formulates the model. Section 4 studies the model in the simplest possible setup, the symmetric two-region economy. Section 5 illustrates the fundamental roles of the structure of the interaction network G. In this section, we follow the strategy taken by Matsuyama (2017) , in that we illustrate the effects of variation in the inter-regional proximity structure G employing stylized examples. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related literature
The current unbundling process of economic agglomeration may also be explained by the "bellshaped development" narrative for industrial agglomeration (Fujita and Thisse, 2013, Section 8) .
The seminal theory of endogenous regional agglomeration after Krugman (1991) predicts that the spatial distribution of economic activities in a country is organized into a mono-centric state as transportation costs decline below a certain threshold in a many-region economy (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2011; Ikeda et al., 2012; Akamatsu et al., 2012 Akamatsu et al., , 2019 . This prediction is qualitatively consistent with data (Tabuchi, 2014) . A further decline of inter-regional transportation cost induces the flattening of mono-centric agglomeration (Helpman, 1998; Tabuchi, 1998) , due to the rise of the relative importance of urban costs, e.g., higher land rent and commuting costs. There is ample evidence for the decline of peak population or production level of cities when transportation access improves (e.g., Baum-Snow, 2007; Baum-Snow et al., 2017) . We may thus interpret that developed economies now face this final stage where once established economic clusters dissolve. These theories, however, do not address how interactions between people matter for regional economy because they deliberately focused on trade linkages as the mode of inter-location interaction in favor of tractability (Fujita and Mori, 2005) . Given the importance of people's communication in more and more information-intensive economies, we need a tractable theory that integrates social interactions into general equilibrium economic geography models. This paper is one of such attempts.
The interesting literature of inter-individual social interactions and cities (e.g., Helsley and Zenou, 2014; Picard and Zenou, 2018) is thus related to our study. Also, the important literature on economics of agglomeration (e.g., Beckmann, 1976; Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002; Helsley and Strange, 2014) examines how inter-location externalities influence the urban spatial structure including the location of firms and households (see Fujita and Thisse, 2013 , for a survey). We take an intermediate strategy between the former emerging literature, which focuses on individual-level social interactions, and the latter literature, which focuses on geographical proximity as the determinant of agglomeration economy. All the above models are different from ours since we consider regional scale.
A question then arises about how inter-regional spillover can arise. Even though various micro-foundations can be considered (as briefly discussed in the introduction), we highlight the role of knowledge creation due to interaction between different cultures. According to Fujita (2007) , geography is an essential feature of knowledge creation and diffusion. For instance, people residing in the same region interact more frequently and thus contribute to develop the same, regional set of cultural ideas. Since geographically distant regions tend to develop different cultures, the economy as a whole evolves according to the synergy which results from interactions across different regions (i.e., different cultures). That is, as emphasized by Duranton and Puga (2001) , knowledge creation and location are inter-dependent. Berliant and Fujita (2012) developed a model of spatial knowledge interactions and showed that higher cultural diversity and costly communication promote the productivity of knowledge creation, which corroborates the empirical findings of Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008) as well as the theoretical model of Ottaviano and Prarolo (2009) . If interaction between different regions with different cultures promotes knowledge creation, a region with good access in passenger transport will be more innovative and productive.
Our flexible model integrates such effects into a general equilibrium framework with costly trade.
Technically, we build on a general analytical method for an economic geography model developed in Ikeda et al. (2012) and Akamatsu et al. (2012) , which is recently synthesized in Akamatsu et al. (2019) . Also, our four-region analysis is inspired by Matsuyama (2017), who considers various tractable geographical settings to investigate how the underlying geographical structure affects the home-market effect in multi-region economy. Barbero and Zofío (2016) is also related to ours, for they focus on the role played by the topology of the underlying transportation network.
The Model
Consider an economy comprised of n regions, and let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of regions. The economy is inhabited by a unit mass continuum of workers who are freely mobile across regions. Each worker chooses one of the regions to locate in. The spatial distribution of workers
We take the Armington (1969) assumption. Each region produces a distinct variety of the horizontally differentiated good. Workers derive utility from the consumption of differentiated varieties. The workers are homogeneous and have identical constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences over differentiated varieties. Because the utility function is homothetic, the total welfare in region j ∈ N is
(3.1)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and q ij is the amount of good produced in region i and consumed in region j.
Production is perfectly competitive and labor is the only input factor. Each worker provides a unit of labor inelastically in the region where they live and is compensated with a wage. The nominal market wage in region j ∈ N is denoted by w j ≥ 0, and its spatial pattern by w = (w i ) i∈N . The wage is determined in market equilibrium which we describe later.
The only (external) centripetal force in the model comes from social interactions. We assume that the productivity in region i is given as:
2)
where ψ ij is the level of externalities from j to i. We denote G ≡ [ψ ij ] and call G the social proximity matrix. Some assumptions on G are introduced.
Assumption 1. The social proximity matrix G = [ψ ij ] satisfies the following property:
(a) ψ ij ∈ (0, 1] for all i, j ∈ N with ψ ii = 1, and
Assumption 1 (a), in particular the positivity of every ψ ij , simplifies the proof of existence of spatial equilibrium. It is not restrictive, since ψ ij can be arbitrarily close to zero. Assumption 1 (b)
is an assumption for interpretation and is less relevant in the theoretical analysis of the model. If the matrix G satisfies Assumption 1 (b), then a(x) = (a i (x)) i∈N = Gx exhibits positive effects of agglomeration (see, e.g., Osawa and Akamatsu, 2019) . For example, consider z = (e i − e j ), with > 0 and e i being ith standard basis. That is, z represents infinitesimal relocation of workers from j to i. Under Assumption 1 (b), the gain in a i induced by such a relocation vector z is strictly greater than the gain in a j , that is, we have a i (x + z) − a i (x) > a j (x + z) − a j (x). That is, relocation of workers induce self-reinforcing effects in terms of regional productivity. Inter-regional transportation of differentiated goods is costly. We assume iceberg transportation costs, i.e., τ ij ≥ 1 units should be shipped from i for a unit to arrive at j, with τ ii = 1. Under perfect competition, the price of the good produced in i and consumed in j is given by
A higher freeness of social interactions increases productivity and firms with higher worker productivity face lower marginal costs and thus charge a smaller optimal price p ij . Under the CES assumption, the value shipped from location i to j is given by
where P j is the CES price index:
Below, we denote D = [φ ij ] and call D the geographical proximity matrix. A key assumption here is that all entries of D are strictly positive, i.e., 1 ≤ τ ij < ∞, which would be natural:
We take Assumptions 1 and 2 to hold throughout the paper.
The regional price index is decreasing in a i , implying that a higher freeness of social interactions decreases the cost of living in region i. As a result, global demand is increasing in the freeness of communications. Markets clear if the regional income is equal to the value of goods sold in all regions, that is, for all i ∈ N :
To normalize w, we assume that the total income of the economy is unity:
Suppose x is positive, that is, x i > 0 for all i ∈ N . Then, there is unique wage vector w that solves market equilibrium conditions (3.6) and (3.7), which leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists unique positive solution w to (3.6) and (3.7) at any positive spatial distribution x.
See Appendix A for the proof. Below, all the proofs for the lemmas or propositions, and the associated technical derivations, are found in Appendix A.
In other words, (3.6) and (3.7) defines w as an implicit function of x. Also, the wage of worker in a region diverges as the mass of workers goes to zero.
With market wage w(x), per capita indirect utility in region i is given by
where we emphasize that price index P i is also a function of x through a(x) and w(x). We use v(x) = (v i (x)) i∈N to denote the indirect utility, or the payoff, of workers as the function of the spatial distribution x. Wage w is differentiable in x due to the implicit function theorem; thus, v is differentiable whenever x i > 0 for all i ∈ N . The exogenous parameters of the model are elasticity of substitution σ > 1, geographical proximity matrix D, and social proximity matrix G. Given parameter values, a spatial equilibrium of the model is a spatial distribution x of workers, and its associated market wage w which satisfies (3.6), that equalizes utility of mobile workers across all regions. In other words, a spatial distribution x is a spatial equilibrium if no mobile worker in region i has an incentive to move to another region j = i. The next result establishes the existence of a spatial equilibrium. Proposition 1. There exists a spatial equilibrium for any σ > 1. All spatial equilibria are positive; all regions are populated at any spatial equilibrium.
The model can thus exhibit the so-called "partial agglomeration." Because there is positive demand for all varieties at any finite level of transportation cost under the Armington assumption and labor is the only input, the market wage of an individual worker diverges when the mass of workers in the same region goes to zero. Thus, the worker's utility in such a region goes to infinity. Therefore, no spatial equilibrium can incorporate depopulated regions. We will illustrate this in Section 4 by numerical examples.
Since multiple equilibria may arise due to the centripetal force embedded by a(·), we consider equilibrium refinement based on some myopic dynamicsẋ = f (x). We focus on dynamics of the formẋ = f (x) = f (x, v(x)), i.e., the dynamics that maps spatial distribution x and payoff level v(x) to a motion vector. We assume that f andf are differentiable for all positive x and satisfy (i) f (x) = 0 if and only if x is a spatial equilibrium of our model and (ii) if f (x) = 0, then v(x) f (x) > 0, and (iii) P f (x, v(x)) = f (Px, Pv(x)) for all permutation matrices P. Conditions (i) and (ii) are, respectively, called Nash stationality and positive correlation (Sandholm, 2010) , which are the most parsimonious assumptions we can impose on a dynamic f to be "consistent" with the underlying model (payoff function) v. Condition (iii) ensures that f is not biased, i.e., it does not ex-ante prefer some regions to the others. In other words, we suppose that all location incentives for workers are captured by the payoff function. We suppose f is C 1 , only because we employ linear stability as the definition of stability. We call dynamics that satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) admissible dynamics.
Admissible dynamics include, for instance, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamic (Brown and von Neumann, 1950; Nash, 1951) , the Smith dynamic (Smith, 1984) , the Euclidian projection dynamic (Dupuis and Nagurney, 1993) , and the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) . See Sandholm (2010) for more examples. The replicator dynamic, which is a standard choice in the economic geography literature, is defined aṡ
(3.9)
The dynamic can violate condition (i) in general payoff functions v(x). However, it satisfies condition (i) in the interior of X and is hence applicable to our model, since spatial equilibria are always interior. The stability claims in the rest of the paper hold true for any admissible dynamics.
We show general properties at the extremal values of transportation costs. Obviously, the uniform distribution of workers across regions is an equilibrium if trade and social interactions are completely frictionless. We formalize as follows.
Proposition 2. Consider the "death-of-distance" limit where trade and social interactions between different regions are completely costless, i.e., the limit when φ ij → 1 and ψ ij → 1 for all i, j ∈ N . Then, the uniform distributionx = (x,x, . . . ,x) withx ≡ 1 n is the unique and stable spatial equilibrium. On the other hand, in the converse limit where trade and social interactions are too costly, the only stable equilibria are full agglomeration towards one of the regions. Proposition 3. Consider the "autarky" limit where trade and social interactions between different regions are prohibitively costly, i.e., the limit when φ ij → 0 and ψ ij → 0 for all i = j. Stable equilibrium spatial patterns are full agglomeration in one of the regions, that is, x i = 1 for some i ∈ N and x j = 0 for all j = i.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the economy exhibits a dispersion process from a mono-centric configuration when transportation costs decline. We will confirm this through examples in Sections 4 and 5. Proposition 3 demonstrates that there are possibility of multiple equilibria, as expected.
Below, we explore concrete examples which are designed to illustrate the essential implications of considering the social proximity structure. Section 4 considers the canonical starting point, the symmetric two regions. Section 5 considers four-region setups with various social proximity structure G to investigate the role of the network structure.
Dispersion process in a two-region economy
As usual, we start with the simplest possible setup -the symmetric two regions -to elucidate basic workings of the model. We study the stability of the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., the uniform distribution. In particular, we show that the uniform distribution is stable when transportation of goods are freer, which is akin to the model by Helpman (1998) . In our model, there is another proximity measure: the freeness of social interactions between the two regions.
When the regions are symmetric, it is natural to assume that
where φ ∈ (0, 1) and ψ ∈ (0, 1). We call φ the freeness of trade and ψ the freeness of communication.
It is easy to see that the uniform distributionx ≡ (x,x) withx = 1 2 is a spatial equilibrium for all (σ, φ, ψ) .
The symmetric distributionx is stable (unstable) if the utility gain for an agent relocating from one region to the other is negative (positive). In the two-region economy, the gain for a hypothetical migrant can be evaluated by the following elasticity:
The gain ω is a positive scalar multiple x v of an eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix of v(x) atx. Multiplyingxv > 0 simplifies the formulae in what follows.
If ω < 0, thenx is stable because there is no incentive for agents to migrate; if ω < 0, a marginal increase in the mass of workers in a region induces a relative decrease of the per capita utility therein.
Similarly,x is unstable if ω > 0; when a small fraction of workers relocate from region 2 to 1, then it induces a relative increase of the payoff in region 1, encouraging further migration from region 2.
Thus, if we start from a state wherex is stable (ω < 0), endogenous agglomeration emerges when the gain turns to positive (ω > 0).
We can evaluate ω as follows:
where χ ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1) are respectively defined by
The variables χ and λ are, respectively, the eigenvalues of row-normalized proximity matrices 1 1+φ D and 1 1+ψ G, with the associated eigenvector being z = (1, −1). As it turns out, Ω plays a major role in our analysis of the model. The variables χ and λ can be understood as, respectively, indices of trade costs and interaction costs. For instance, χ is decreasing in φ, that is, χ is large (small) when trade barriers are high (low). Note that the denominator of ω is positive for all admissible values of σ and φ.
The numerator of ω reveals the net agglomeration and dispersion forces in the model. The first term is negative and thus represents the dispersion force due to costly trade. In particular, if a is a constant vector that does not depend on the spatial distribution of workers, then λ = 0 and thus ω < 0. That is,x is always stable if a is constant. This is simply because, without any agglomerative forces, costly trade of goods discourages uneven concentration of workers. Also, In the context of economic geography models with no social proximity structure, Akamatsu et al. (2019) calls Ω that satisfies ω ≡ Ω(χ) the gain function of a model. we see that the dispersion force strengthens when φ increases, since χ is decreasing in φ. Because every region specializes on a single variety, workers' love for variety due to the CES preferences induces a stronger centrifugal force when trade is freer. The second term is positive and represents the agglomerative force due to the productivity spillover (3.2). Because λ ∈ (0, 1) is monotonically decreasing in ψ, this force is at its strongest when ψ is small, which is intuitive.
To obtain more insights, we may break down ω as follows:
where a and w are the following elasticities of payoff difference v 1 − v 2 with respect to, respectively, a 1 and w 1 at x =x:
withā ≡ a 1 (x) =ā(1 + ψ) andw = 1 being the uniform levels of regional productivity and wage. Also, α x and β x are, respectively, the following elasticities of a 1 and w 1 with respect to migration of workers from one region to the other:
Note that regions are interchangeable, so we can swap the indices in the above expressions.
At the uniform distributionx, we can evaluate as follows:
All the first three elasticities are positive and thus migration of workers tends to cause positive circular causality and thus destabilizex. When trade is more costly (φ is small and thus χ is large), then the payoff difference is more sensitive to the variation in productivity ( a is large), whereas it is less sensitive to wage ( w is small). Also, a region's productivity is sensitive to migration when social interactions are costly because α x = λ is large when ψ is small. Only the last elasticity, β x , can be negative and produce a stabilizing effect. It is negative when
that is, when ψ and φ are sufficiently large (and/or σ is sufficiently small). In fact, β x can be further decomposed as follows:
where ξ a and ξ x are the elasticities of nominal wage difference w 1 − w 2 respect to, respectively, the productivity in region 1 and the mass of worker in region 1 and are given as follows: Notes: The uniform distributionx is stable for the shaded (gray) region of (φ, ψ) and the black solid curve indicates the critical pair of (φ, ψ) wherex becomes unstable. The horizontal and vertical dashed lines correspond to the parametric paths for the bifurcation diagrams Figure 2a and Figure 2b , respectively. The schematic on each (gray or white) parametric region indicates the representative spatial pattern in the parametric region.
We see that ξ a > 0. A population increase in region 1 induces relative productivity increase α x = λ > 0, which in turn gives rise to an increase in nominal wage in the region since ξ a α x > 0.
On the other hand, ξ w < 0. If the mass of worker in a region increases, then it brings about a negative effect on nominal wage since the total revenue in a region is given by w i x i . The single
value ω thus captures the net effect through the combination of all the effects discussed above.
With the formula of ω, we have the following characterization of the stability ofx. (φ, ψ) below whichx becomes unstable, i.e., the solutions for ω (φ, ψ) = Ω(χ(φ), λ(ψ)) = 0. The uniform distributionx is stable in the shaded areas of (φ, ψ), and unstable otherwise. For any φ ∈ (0, 1),x is stable when the freeness of social interactions ψ is sufficiently high. When ψ is small and inter-region communication is lower, agents tend to agglomerate due to positive externalities.
Let φ * be the critical value of φ at whichx becomes unstable. In terms of σ and ψ, the critical value is given as follows:
If φ * ∈ (0, 1), then the uniform distribution is stable for all φ ∈ (φ * , 1). If otherwise φ * ≥ 1, then
x is unstable for all φ ∈ (0, 1), so that the economy always exhibits asymmetry (e.g., x 1 > x 2 ). For this reason, the requirement that φ * ∈ (0, 1) may be called "no-black-hole" condition following Fujita et al. (1999) . We have φ * ∈ (0, 1) either when σ ∈ (1, 2) (which is unrealistic) or when elasticity of substitution σ is relatively large and the freeness of interaction ψ is relatively small, then migration towards one of the regions is profitable.
When the threshold value φ * (or that in terms of ψ) is attained, the uniform distribution becomes unstable and endogenous agglomeration emerges. Figure 2 shows the bifurcation diagram of stable spatial equilibria in terms of x 1 when φ and/or ψ varies. Figures 2a and 2b show, respectively, the bifurcation diagrams for the horizontal and vertical dashed lines in Figure 1 . Figure 2c shows the bifurcation diagram of stable equilibrium values of x 1 over the full (φ, ψ)-space. The uniform distribution is stable for high values of φ or ψ, and the stable paths are continuous in transportation cost parameter axes. Thus, the model highlights the process of the resolution of an established agglomeration when φ and/or ψ monotonically increases. This is akin to Helpman (1998)'s model, with an additional dimension of social proximity ψ. There are no catastrophic jumps nor hysteresis whenx becomes unstable, which is also similar to Helpman (1998) and others. We can formally
show that the bifurcation fromx is a supercritical pitchfork, which essentially means that the dispersion process is "reversible."
Proposition 5. The bifurcation fromx in the course of decreasing φ, or decreasing ψ, is of the supercritical pitchfork form. The dispersion process of economic activities is smooth and gradual as the economy become more symmetric.
Asymmetries in the proximity matrices (D and G) induce straightforward comparative advantages. Figure 3 shows examples in which the two regions are asymmetric. In Figures 3a and 3b, we respectively assume D and G of the form
For both the cases, region 1 has comparative advantage (in terms of cost of living or productivity). The bifurcation diagrams exhibit the standard unfolding behavior for the supercritical pitchfork bifurcation, for which transition on the main path (the path with x 1 > x 2 ) is smooth without any catastrophic behaviors. The economy is always asymmetric and the uniform distribution emerges only in the limits φ → 1 or ψ → 1.
How the network structure of social proximity matters
We now turn our attention to a multi-region geography with more than two regions to identify two quintessential roles of the social proximity structure G: (i) one on the timing of dispersion;
and (ii) the other on the overall spatial distribution of workers.
This section considers a symmetric four-region geography in which n = 4 regions are equidistantly placed over a circular transportation network (see Figure 4 ), as in Matsuyama (2017), Example 2. This is a simplified version of the 12-location race-track economy of Krugman (1993) .
It is the minimal symmetric geographical environment in which different regions have different neighbors (three is not enough). By postulating that the transportation of goods is only possible over the circular network, we can assume that the geographical proximity matrix is given by
where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the freeness of trade between two consecutive regions over the economy. Four is also the minimal number that allow nontrivial structures of social interactions between locations. Taking D in (5.1) as given, we consider three stylized settings for G, shown in Figure 5 , to elucidate the basic roles of the social proximity structure. Figure 5a shows the baseline case where the movement of people is governed by a similar transportation technology as goods trade (e.g., Notes: (a) The baseline case where the movement of people is governed by a similar transportation technology as goods trade (e.g., highways, low-speed railways). (b) A case where the pairs of regions at the antipodal locations are socially close (due to some transportation modes specialized to passenger trips, e.g., high-speed railways, regional airlines). (c) A case where the social proximity matrix have a hierarchical structure (due to, e.g., intra-country developments of passenger transports before an economic integration).
highways, low-speed railways). Figure 5b represents a case where there are some transportation modes specialized to passenger trips such as regional airlines, which tend to shorten travel time across distant locations. Figure 5c is a case where the passenger transportation modes has a block structure due to, e.g., intra-country developments before a major economic integration.
The social proximity matrices for the three cases are, respectively, given as follows:
where ψ ∈ (0, 1) and ψ ∈ (0, 1). For G , we assume ψ > 2ψ − 1 to satisfy Assumption 1 (b). In fact, G is a special case of G where ψ = ψ 2 . For G , we assume ψ ≤ ψ without loss of generality.
All regions have the same level of geographical proximity to the other regions under D in (5.1). Also, for any G , G , and G , the social proximity matrix does not induce any ex-ante comparative advantage of regions and preserves the symmetry of the four-region economy. Thus, uniform distributionx = (x,x,x,x) withx ≡ 1 4 is a spatial equilibrium for any (σ, φ, ψ, ψ ). In the following, we study the stability ofx and endogenous agglomeration fromx.
An important difference from the two-region case is that there are three qualitatively distinct migration patterns whenx becomes unstable. Figure 6 schematically shows the three possible Notes: The black circle indicates the transportation network. Each gray disk represents the population size of each region. We do not show rotationally symmetric patterns that are essentially equivalent to the three patterns shown above (e.g., the "East-West" pattern).
outcomes. These migration patterns are, in fact, the eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix of the payoff function atx. Figure 6a and Figure 6c correspond to the formation of a mono-centric spatial distribution where one region or two contiguous regions attract the majority of workers. The latter may be called the "North-South" pattern. Figure 6b corresponds to the emergence of duo-centric configuration where two geographically remote regions are vying with each other.
A more "realistic" setup is the star-shaped network, where one of the regions -maybe the host of the capital city -is the hub for the social interactions in the economy. For example, when region 1 is connected symmetrically to all the other regions but there is no direct interaction path between regions 2, 3, and 4, we have
This assumption induces an exogenous advantage in region 1, thereby the results are straightforward (cf. the asymmetric cases in Section 4). That is, the spatial pattern becomes mono-centric, with region 1 as the central location. We instead focus on symmetric networks where no region has exogenous advantages in terms of proximity to the other regions.
The baseline case and endogenous agglomeration in many-region settings
This section considers the most straightforward assumption, G (Figure 5a) , where the social proximity matrix has a similar structure to the geographical proximity matrix D. This setup is related to geographically decaying spillovers considered in urban economics models.
In many-region settings to be considered in Section 5, the stability ofx = (x,x,x,x) is governed by the largest eigenvalue of the payoff elasticity matrix V =xv ∇v(x). To see this, suppose thatx is perturbed to become x =x + z with small z = (z i ) i∈N , where z 1 = ∑ i∈N z i = 0 because the total population is constant. In other words, z is a migration pattern. The average gain (in terms of relative payoff) induced by such a deviation is ω(z) ≡ z Vz (5.4) because we show, via linearization v(x ) ≈ v(x) + ∇v(x)z, that the elasticity of average payoff
Ifω(z) < 0 for any perturbation z, then any form of migration is strictly non-profitable for migrants and hencex is stable.
Appendix A.2 shows that the average gainω is maximized by deviation of the form z = z * , where z * is the eigenvector of V associated with its largest eigenvalue, ω * ≡ max k {ω k }. That is, we have
where {ω k } are the eigenvalues of V. If ω * < 0, thenω < 0 for any z. When ω * switches from negative to positive, then migration towards z * -direction becomes profitable for workers and the spatial pattern of the form x =x + z * ( > 0) emerges. When G = G , we have
which is an eigenvector of V. We have ω * z * = Vz * = V z * and thus
Analogous to (4.2), (5.8) indicates that the migration from region 3 to 1 is profitable for workers.
Thus, when ω * turns from negative, the spatial pattern becomes a mono-centric pattern of the form x =x + z * = (x + ,x,x − ,x), as in Figure 6a . The above discussion generalizes the two-region investigation where we employ gain ω. When n = 2, ω is the only relevant eigenvalue of V and z * = (1, −1). Endogenous agglomeration is essentially x =x + z * = (x + ,x − ). The next proposition characterizes the stability ofx and endogenous agglomeration from it. Proposition 6. Suppose n = 4. Assume D in (5.1) and G = G . Then, ω * = Ω(χ, λ) and z * = (1, 0, −1, 0). The uniform distributionx is linearly stable if and only if ω * < 0. Whenx becomes unstable, then a mono-centric pattern of the formx + z * ( > 0) emerges. Figure 6a shows the endogenous spatial pattern under this setting. In Proposition 6, χ and λ are the same as Proposition 4, that is, χ = 1−φ 1+φ and λ = 1−ψ 1+ψ . These are, in fact, the eigenvalues of the row-normalized proximity matrices since we havē (5.10) where χ and λ can be seen as, again, the measures of transportation and interaction costs in the economy. As seen, ω * is computed via (χ, λ) and Ω, similar to the n = 2 case. Figure 7 shows the bifurcation diagram for G = G in the φ-axis. The levels of φ at which ω 1 = 0 and ω 2 = 0 are indicated by, respectively, φ * 1 and φ * 2 . We have ω * = max{ω 1 , ω 2 } = ω 1 for any (φ, ψ, σ) . As discussed in the two-region case, the dispersion force due to costly trade, the first term in Ω(χ, λ), is triggered when φ is high. When φ is in its lower extreme (φ → 0), workers can concentrate in a single region because the dispersion force is less important. The spatial pattern is close to the complete agglomeration, e.g., x ≈ (1, 0, 0, 0), which is consistent with Proposition 3. As φ increases, the relative rise of the dispersion force induces a crowding-out from the populated region. The spatial pattern become, e.g.,
which is a mono-centric pattern. As φ increases, the spatial pattern gradually flattens and, at the threshold φ * 1 , the spatial pattern must connect to the uniform distribution. If we start from x and gradually decrease φ to see the dispersion process in the reverse-reproduced way, at φ * 1 the spatial pattern must deviate in the direction of the "formation" of a mono-centric configuration (Figure 6a ). Proposition 6 predicts this bifurcation at φ * 1 . To the left of the figure, the two city pattern also emerge (indicated by blue dashed curve). However, this configuration is always unstable.
How the network structure of social proximity affects the timing of dispersion?
We next illustrate that the timing of agglomeration varies with the structure of G. If every region has the same interaction level to different regions, we can assume that G takes the following form:
This setup is akin to equidistant geographical networks considered by, e.g., Gaspar et al. (2018 Gaspar et al. ( , 2019 . This economy can be thought as an "almost connected economy," since the payoff in a region is invariant under the permutation of mobile workers in the other regions. That is, the exact distribution of workers over the other regions does not matter.
For this setting, we have z * = (1, 0, −1, 0), in line with Section 5.1. The difference appears in the measure of interaction cost. Concretely, we have the following result. The only difference from Proposition 6 is that we havẽ
at the place of λ. Similar to Section 5.1,λ is the eigenvalue of G × associated with z * . We seẽ (5.13) which indicates that the average level of interaction cost in the economy is higher for the network G than for G | ψ =ψ , which is intuitive. As we note Ω(χ, λ) is increasing in λ, we have Ω(χ, λ) > Ω(χ,λ) for any (φ, ψ) . As a result,
x is stable for a wider range of (φ, ψ). Figure 8 illustrates this observation. The solid and dashed curves indicate, respectively, critical pairs (φ * , ψ * ) for the matrices G × and G . For each case,x is stable in the region above the threshold curve. The solid curve is always below the dashed curve, so thatx is stable for a broader range of φ and ψ when G × . This is because, since the economy is socially more "connected" than G = G , there is less incentive to form agglomeration. The result suggests that if social interactions is "closer" than geographical distance, it can promote dispersion of economic activities towards the peripheral regions.
How the network structure of social proximity affects the form of dispersion?
For both the cases considered in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, endogenous mechanisms induce a monocentric agglomeration of the form Figure 6a . Endogenous spatial patterns can be, in fact, affected by interaction structure G. Notes: The black solid curve shows the critical pairs (φ * , ψ * ) at whichx becomes unstable for the case G = G with ψ = ψ. The dashed curve is that for the case G = G . The uniform distributionx is stable for the regions above these curves, where the gray regions correspond to G = G × . Observe that the solid curve stays below the dashed curve. That is,x is stable for a wider range of (φ, ψ) when the economy is more connected.
To see this section considers general G with arbitrary ψ ∈ (0, 1) (with ψ > 2ψ − 1 to satisfy Assumption 1 (b)). We have the following characterization, which includes Propositions 6 and 7 as the special cases.
Proposition 8. Suppose n = 4. Assume D in (5.1) and G = G with arbitrary ψ ∈ (0, 1) such that
The uniform distributionx is linearly stable if and only if ω * < 0. Whenx become unstable, then either the mono-centric patternx + z 1 if ω * = ω 1 or the duo-centric patternx + z 2 emerges ( > 0) if ω * = ω 2 .
Simply put, the duo-centric pattern (Figure 6b ) can emerge, in contrast to Sections Section 5.1 and Section 5.2. The condition for the emergence of the duo-centric pattern is simply ω * = ω 2 (or ω 2 > ω 1 ) whenx becomes unstable; the formation of the duo-centric pattern is more profitable for workers than the mono-centric pattern when ω * = ω 2 . We highlight that ψ > ψ is necessary for the duo-centric pattern to emerge. When ψ > ψ, then region 1 is more socially "connected" to region 3 than to regions 2 or 4, and hence benefits more from social interactions with region 3 than with the others. Thus, with respect to G, the regions at the antipodal locations in the circle are closer.
Similar to Sections 5.1 and 5.2, λ 1 and λ 2 are the eigenvalues of the row-normalized social proximity matrix. They are the indices of the inter-regional interaction costs when, respectively, the mono-centric and duo-centric configurations emerge. For instance, by employing the formula for ω * , we show that the uniform distribution can be stable for some φ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if (σ − 1) max{λ 1 , λ 2 } < 1. If inter-regional communication is almost prohibitive (i.e., ψ → 0 and ψ → 0), we have λ 1 → 1 and λ 2 → 1. Thus,x cannot be stable for such a case if σ > 2, which is obviously satisfied by the standard values of σ (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004) . When σ is sufficiently large, then workers are better off concentrating on a single region because differentiated goods are substitutes whereas inter-regional social interactions are too costly. Figure 9 shows a numerical example in which ω * = ω 2 , so that stable duo-centric patterns emerge fromx. In line with Figure 7 , φ * 1 and φ * 2 indicate, respectively, the level of φ at which we have ω 1 = 0 and ω 2 = 0. When φ is small, a mono-centric distribution is stable (solid red curve), which is similar to Figure 7 . As φ increases, dispersion proceeds. The difference from Figure 7 is that region 3 attracts more workers than regions 2 and 4 in this process. For some range of φ, there is a duo-centric concentration towards regions 1 and 3, but with asymmetry such that x 1 > x 3 . At some point, the economy jumps to the symmetric two-peaked distribution (solid blue curve).
The two-peaked distribution connects smoothly to the uniform distribution at the critical value φ * 2 . Proposition 8 predicts the bifurcation at φ * 2 .
Super-regions
This section considers the case G = G to investigate the role of hierarchical structure in the social proximity between regions as shown in Figure 5c . In the network G , the pairs of regions {1, 2} and {3, 4} can be interpreted as "super-regions." Social interactions between the regions in the same super-region is freer than those between two regions in different super-regions, since we assume ψ < ψ without loss of generality.
The following proposition shows that the stability ofx is determined by ψ and the bifurcation fromx leads to the formation of a North-South pattern in Figure 6c .
Proposition 9. Suppose n = 4. Assume D in (5.1) and G = G with ψ < ψ. Then, ω * = Ω(χ, λ ) and
This jump is encountered at a limit point for the mono-centric configuration (indicated by ♦), which is evidence of a saddle-node bifurcation. Notes: ψ = ψ 2 < ψ with ψ = 0.8 and σ = 4. The solid curves indicate stable equilibria, whereas the dashed or dotted curves indicate unstable ones. The red curves are mono-centric patterns, whereas the blue curve duo-centric pattern. The schematics by the solid curves show representative snapshots of associated stable spatial patterns. For φ ∈ (φ * 3 , φ * 2 ), the North-South pattern emerges. The economy exhibits a hierarchical structure of the North-South asymmetry and intra-regional asymmetry for the range φ ∈ (0, φ * 3 ).
The uniform distributionx is linearly stable if and only if ω * < 0. Whenx become unstable, then a North-South pattern of the formx + z * ( > 0) emerges.
That is, the four-region economy with G = G has quite similar properties as the two-region case. The intra-super-region interaction level, ψ, does not affect the bifurcation fromx since ω * does not include it. Thus, we can regard each regional super-region as a "big" region, so we recover the two-region economy. There are two other possible migration patterns (i.e., the eigenvectors of V), but they are less profitable than North-South pattern z * . To be concrete, the possible migration patterns in this economy are z 1 = z * = (1, 1, −1, −1), z 2 = (1, −1, 1, −1), and z 3 = (1, −1, −1, 1).
(5.15) However, Appendix A.2 shows that the gains (i.e., the eigenvalues of V) associated with these patterns satisfy ω * = ω 1 = max{ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 } for all (φ, ψ, σ) . The second migration pattern, z 2 , is the duo-centric pattern (Figure 6b ), whereas the third an East-West pattern (90 • rotation of the North-South pattern). The duo-centric pattern is less profitable than the East-West pattern, because, in the latter, the two big regions are close to each other and hence enjoy greater productivity than the former pattern. Similarly, the North-South pattern benefits from greater productivity than the East-West pattern, since the freeness of interaction between the two big regions are ψ in the former and ψ < ψ in the latter. Thus, the most profitable deviation fromx is North-South pattern z 1 . Figure 10 shows a numerical example for this case. Each φ * k indicates the level of φ at which we have ω k = 0 (k = 1, 2, 3). When φ is small, again a one-peaked distribution is stable (solid red curve). As φ increases, dispersion proceeds. The difference from Figure 7 or Figure 9 is that the North regions consistently attract more workers than the South. In the range φ ∈ (0, φ * 3 ), it is the process of gradual dispersion between regional super-regions, and the dispersion within the North. For the South, the process is ambiguous because there are two effects (within-and between-bloc) at work. For the range φ ∈ (φ * 3 , φ * 1 ) there is a steady North-South pattern, which connects smoothly tox at the critical value φ * 1 as predicted by Proposition 9. The process is understood as a hierarchical combination of the two-region story in Section 4.
We can show that the economy becomes closer to the baseline case in Section 5.1 as ψ → ψ. We have φ * 3 → φ * 1 as ψ → ψ and then the bifurcation at φ * 1 lead to the mono-centric pattern (Figure 6a ) as in Section 5.1. In fact, when z 1 and z 3 become profitable at the same time, we see the migration pattern becomes 1 2 (z 1 + z 3 ) = (1, 0, −1, 0), i.e., the mono-centric pattern.
Concluding remarks
This paper considered a bare-bones general equilibrium model with two proximity structures, one due to trade linkage and the other due to social linkage. The former is the standard linkage which many economic geography models in the literature focus on. In the symmetric two-region economy, we confirm that uniform dispersion is stable when the economy is integrated in terms of trade or social interactions. This is similar to the so-called "re-dispersion" in economic geography models with urban costs. In many-region settings, there are two first-order theoretical insights into the role of the additional proximity structure due to social interactions. First, it is demonstrated that the structure of the social proximity matrix affects the timing of endogenous agglomeration.
Particularly, when the economy is socially more connected, there is less incentive for endogenous agglomeration. Second, the structure of social interaction network can, even when it is ex-ante symmetric, endogenously determine the overall form of the spatial distribution of workers across regions. Our examples, for instance, show that the number of major economic centers can depend on the interaction structure. When trade costs of goods become less relevant, the structure of social proximity emerges as a determinant of geographical distribution of workers.
The model considered in this paper obviously is a simple reduced-form; we build on the compromise that the social proximity structure is exogenously given. As discussed in Section 1, there are various interpretations for the "social proximity" matrix. The most interesting extension would be the endogenous determination of the social proximity structure in equilibrium. For such micro-founded models, our framework can be utilized to obtain coarse insights into the role of an additional network structure.
Proof of Proposition 1. In general, a spatial equilibrium is a spatial distribution x ∈ X such that the following Nash equilibrium condition is met for the location choice of workers:
where v * is an equilibrium payoff. The following variational inequality problem is equivalent to (A.10):
Every region is necessarily populated at any spatial equilibrium when D and G are positive (i.e., φ ij > 0 and ψ ij > 0 for all i, j ∈ N ). First, a i (x) > 0 for all i ∈ N at any x ∈ X when G is positive. Next, we see
where C 3 ≡ min j =i a σ−1 j φ ij > 0 (by positivity of φ ij ) and C 4 ≡ min j =i w 1−σ j > 0 (by positivity of w i shown by Lemma 1). Note also that C 4 is bounded for all positive x.
By (A.11) and (A.9), for any sequence of positive spatial patterns {x n } ∞ n=1 that converges to a spatial distribution such that x i = 0, w i (x n ) and v i (x n ) both diverge to positive infinity as n → ∞. On the other hand, by Lemma 1, w is uniquely given if we focus on the regions with positive population N + ≡ {k ∈ N | x k > 0} by letting w i := ∞ and w i x i := 0 for all i ∈ N 0 ≡ {k ∈ N | x k = 0}. Then, v i (x) is finite for all i ∈ N + , while v i (x) is infinitely large for any i ∈ N 0 . Since such spatial distribution cannot be a spatial equilibrium, every region is necessarily populated in equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium condition (A.10) in fact reduces to the equality: v i (x) = v j (x) for all i, j ∈ N .
Consider the following variational inequality problem, which is a "restricted" version of (VIP):
where X ≡ {x ∈ X | x i > ∀i ∈ N } for some > 0. Since v is differentiable and thus continuous on X , and X is compact and convex, by Corollary 2.2.5 of Facchinei and Pang (2003) , the set of solutions for (VIP ) is nonempty and compact for any choice of > 0. There is some > 0 for which all solutions for (VIP ) are in the (relative) interior of X because v i (x) is continuous in x and diverges when x i → 0. Because any interior solution for (VIP ) must satisfy v i (x) = v j (x) for all i, j ∈ N , they are spatial equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose φ ij = 1 and ψ ij = 1 for all i, j ∈ N . Then, a i (x) = 1 and .12) This implies that
Since all regions are populated in equilibrium, we have m i =m ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ N for x to be an equilibrium. By (A.12), w i =w > 0 for all i ∈ N . From (A.13), we conclude x i =m w =x = 1 n for all i ∈ N . That is,x is the unique equilibrium. The stability ofx can be shown by knowing V x is negative definite at x =x. In fact, V x is symmetric atx and all of its relevant eigenvalues take the same value −σ −1 < 0. This can be shown by letting χ k → 0 and λ k → 0 in Fact A.1 shown below.
Proof of Proposition 3. When φ ij = 0 and ψ ij = 0 so that inter-regional trade and social interactions are prohibitive, we have a i = x i for all i ∈ N . Further, the market equilibrium conditions reduce to:
and v i (x) = x i . Therefore, any spatial distribution in which the populated regions have the same population is an equilibrium when φ ij and ψ ij vanish for all i = j. However, all such equilibria with more than one populated regions cannot be stable under natural dynamics since any migration between populated regions induce relative payoff advantages. Therefore, the economy ends up with a complete mono-centric agglomeration when φ ij = 0 and ψ ij = 0 for all i = j. Because equilibria is continuous in φ ij and ψ ij , we conclude the assertion.
A.2 Stability of the uniform distribution
We first give general characterization of stability ofx for both n = 2 and n = 4. Our approach build on Akamatsu et al. (2012) , which is recently synthesized by Akamatsu et al. (2019) .
For any D > 0 and G > 0, we compute that
where M = [m ij ] with m ij defined by (A.7). The Jacobian matrix of wage with respect to spatial distribution
x, W x , is given by the implicit function theorem regarding the short-run market equilibrium condition:
where y = (w i x i ) i∈N . We note A x = G. Consider a n-region economy (n ≥ 2). Suppose uniform distributionx = (x,x, . . . ,x) withx = 1 n . Let D andḠ be the row-normalized versions of D and G. We have M =D andâ −1 A x =Ḡ atx. We impose the following assumption onD andḠ, which is satisfied by our examples in Sections 4 and 5.
Assumption A.3. BothD andḠ are either circulants or block circulants with circulant blocks (BCCBs).
Under the assumption,D andḠ commute. In turn, we evaluate as follows:
wherev is the uniform level of payoff atx. We let V =xv V x . By assumption, V is real and symmetric. When V is negative definite with respect to TX = {z ∈ R n | ∑ i∈N z i = 0},x is evolutionary stable state (see Sandholm, 2010, Observation 8.3.11) . Then,x is stable under all admissible dynamics. Since V is symmetric, it is negative definite if and only if all of its eigenvalues with respect to TX is negative. We have the following fact (see, e.g., Horn and Johnson, 2012).
Fact A.1. Under Assumption A.3, the eigenvalues of V are given by:
where each column vector is an eigenvector (migration pattern) of V. The relevant eigenvector is z = (1, −1),
We have ω k = Ω(χ k , λ k ) = 0 if and only if ω k ≡ Ω (χ k , λ k ) = 0. Since λ 1 > λ 3 > λ 2 and χ 1 = χ 3 > χ 2 , we see ω 1 = max k {ω k }. Thus, North-South pattern z 1 (Figure 6c ) must emerge whenx become unstable.
A.3 Pitchfork bifurcation from the uniform distribution
Proof of Proposition 5. When n = 2, the uniform distributionx = (x,x) can be viewed as steady-state solution y = 0 for the following one-dimensional autonomous system:
where we choose y ∈ Y ≡ (−x,x) and let x(y) = (x 1 (y), x 2 (y)) ≡ (x + y,x − y). The bifurcation parameter µ indicates either φ or ψ. Under admissible dynamics, the bifurcation diagram become smoothly equivalent to the system (A.40). In the following, prime (') denotes differentiation with respect to one-dimensional variable y.
In general, the system (A.40) undergoes pitchfork bifurcation at (y, µ) = (0, µ * ) when ∆v(y, µ) is odd in y and the following conditions are met (see, e.g., Wiggins, 2003, Section 20.1E) :
We see ∆v is odd: ∆v(−y, µ) = −∆v(y, µ). The fourth condition also follows, for ∆v(0, µ) = 0 for all µ.
The first condition (nonhyperbolicity) ensures that µ = µ * is the bifurcation point:
where z = (1, −1) and we recall ω is the eigenvalue of V =xv V x associated with z. The bifurcation point regarding freeness parameters (φ, ψ) is the solution for ω = 0 and we have ∆v (0, µ) = 0. For ω(φ, ψ) = 0 (or Ω (χ(φ), λ(ψ)) = 0) to admit solution such that (χ, λ) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1), we need λ * ≡ 1 − χ (σ − 1) + σχ ∈ (0, 1) ∀χ ∈ (0, 1), (A.44) or, equivalently, either σ > 2, or σ ∈ (1, 2] and χ ∈ ( 2−σ σ+1 , 1). We assume either of these below. From (A.43), we see .45) by noting that ω(µ * ) = 0. With (A.22), we show the fifth condition in (A.41):
For ∆v (0, µ * ) and ∆v (0, µ * ), we resort to more explicit computations. Let w 1 : Y → R + and w 2 : Y → R + denote, respectively, the nominal wages of regions 1 and 2 as functions of y ∈ Y. We first derive required derivatives of w 1 and w 2 . By the normalization of income, we have w 1 (y)x 1 (y) + w 2 (y)x 2 (y) = w 1 (y)(x + y) + w 2 (y)(x − y) = 1 ∀y ∈ Y (A.48) and w 1 (0) = w 2 (0) =w ≡ 1. These imply w 1 (0) = −w 2 (0), w 1 (0) = w 2 (0) = − 2 x w 1 (0), and w 1 (0) = −w 2 (0). (A.49) For instance, we have w 1 (y)(x + y) + w 1 (y) + w 2 (y)(x − y) − w 2 (y) = 0. With w 1 (0) = w 2 (0) = 1, it implies that w 1 (0) = −w 2 (0), which is a manifestation that the regions are symmetric when y = 0. In fact, w 1 (0) is the eigenvalue of W x (x) associated with z = (1, −1), because we have
which is, w 1 (0)z = W x (x)z. Therefore, we have
where we recall Ω (χ) ≡ σ + (σ − 1)χ. Then, w (0) can be evaluated by the second identity in (A.49). Also, by a patient algebra, we compute w 1 (0) as follows:
Further, a(y) = (a 1 (y), a 2 (y)) ≡ (a 1 (x(y)), a 2 (x(y))) satisfȳ
and a i (0) = a i (0) = · · · = 0. We nonte that a 1 (0) = a 2 (0) =ā ≡x(1 + ψ). By direct computations employing the above results, we confirm that ∆v (0, µ * ) =v(1 − χ) −w 1 (0) 2 + w 2 (0) 2 + w 1 (0) − w 2 (0) = 0 (A.55) from (A.49). Therefore, the second condition in (A.41) is met. After some tedious calculations and manipulations, we get:
where we define Θ ≡ σ(2σ − 1) + Ω (χ) 3 + σ (σ + 1)χ 2 + (4σ − 5)χ + σ − 5 . (A.57)
We can show Θ > 0 provided that bifurcation occur (i.e., condition (A.44) is satisfied). Since the other components of ∆v (0, µ * ) are obviously negative, we have ∆v (0, µ * ) < 0 at critical values of φ or ψ. Thus, all the five conditions in (A.41) are met atx. The economy undergoes pitchfork bifurcations along smooth paths where either the freeness of social interactions or the freeness of trade increases, at the break points defined by ψ * and φ * , respectively. Moreover, ∆v (0, µ * ) < 0 implies that the pitchfork bifurcations are supercritical, i.e., the bifurcated branches are stable. Notes: The uniform distributionx is stable for the shaded (gray) region of (φ, ψ) and the black solid curve indicates the critical pair of (φ, ψ) wherex becomes unstable. The horizontal and vertical dashed lines in Figure 11c correspond to the parametric paths for the bifurcation diagrams Figure 2a and Figure 2b , respectively. The schematic on each (gray or white) parametric region indicates the representative spatial pattern in the parametric region. Notes: The black solid curves show the critical pairs (φ * , ψ * ) at whichx becomes unstable for the case G = G with ψ = ψ. The dashed curves are those for the case G = G . The uniform distributionx is stable for the regions above these curves, where the gray regions correspond to G = G × . Observe that the solid curves always stay below the dashed curves. That is,x is stable for a wider range of (φ, ψ) when the economy is more connected. 
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